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The Meiji Restoration has been the subject of voluminous research. Most work has
concentrated on the internal causes and consequences of the event. Some scholars,
notably Ishii Takashi, have explored the international context of the Meiji Restora-
tion.1) On the one hand, the Meiji Restoration has been compared with other major
revolutions such as the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution. On the other
hand, the role of foreigners, particularly the French and the British, has been exam-
ined. But one area that so far has received little attention is the way in which the
Restoration was understood by outsiders; in other words, the foreign image of the
Meiji Restoration. This paper sets out to look at the understandings Americans had of
events taking place in Japan in the years between1867 and 1869. Americans had only
a few years earlier experienced their own civil war. Interestingly, it was through the
lens of this experience that Americans saw the Restoration: they saw it as a conflict
between north and south and as a conflict between adherence to tradition and an open-
ness to change. The questions this paper will address are basic: what did Americans
think the conflict was about? When did it begin? When did it end? Who won and
why? My sources include American diplomatic correspondence and American news-
papers, particularly letters sent regularly from the Yokohama-based correspondent to
the San Francisco newspaper, the Daily Alta California.2) I will also concentrate on
the understanding constructed by the American Minister Resident in Japan, General
Robert Van Valkenburgh.
The New Tycoon
Robert Bruce Van Valkenburgh (1821–1888) took up his appointment as American
Resident Minister to Japan in 1866, arriving in midst of a second punitive expedition
against the recalcitrant Chos¯hu ¯domain. The death of Shogun Iemochi provided a
pretext to halt the hostilities. Late that year Hitotsubashi Keiki succeeded to the head-
ship of the Tokugawa family and later formally became the 15th shogun. In a letter
dated December 22, 1866 Van Valkenburgh reported to Secretary of State William
Seward that the new Tycoon “appears to be a man of energy and ability, and not
wedded to the policy of his predecessor. . . . I trust I shall soon be able to report to you
that all civil commotion in Japan is at an end.”3)
Van Valkenburgh was granted an official audience with Keiki on May 3, 1867. He
was impressed: “His Majesty the Tycoon is 31 years of age, and of extremely prepos-
46
sessing appearance. There is that about him which stamps him as a gentleman; such
simple dignity and such an air of perfect breeding, only equaled by his intelligence,
which is as superior as it is unassuming.” Van Valkenburgh clearly saw Keiki as a
progressive force in Japan. On the next day, the American Minister delivered his
letter of credence to the new shogun and spoke briefly: “The United States have re-
cently come safely through the ordeal of war; rebellion existed among us; but the
loyal hearts of the people, true to the instincts of patriotism, and guided by the aid of
a Divine Providence on the field and on the sea, overcame that rebellion, and the
Constitution and the laws were vindicated. That your Majesty may come safely
through all present difficulties, overcoming or conciliating your enemies, and that
your reign may continue through a succession of many years of peace, prosperity, and
happiness to your Majesty and to the empire you rule, is the earnest wish of the Pres-
ident and the people of my country.” Keiki’s reply also touched on the civil war: “It
gave us pleasure to learn that the war in your country has recently been brought an a
successful termination; that the North and the South are at peace; and that the power
of your government, by subduing the rebellion, has been fully vindicated. We are
pleased that the President has appointed you his minister resident to this country. You
appreciate our situation and act accordingly, and this we highly prize.”4)
Abdication — November 14, 1867
Van Valkenburgh continued to see progress toward peace in Japan. Plans proceed-
ed for the opening of Edo to foreigners on January 1, 1868. In a letter dated October
22, 1867 to Seward, Van Valkenburgh gave details about the opening of Edo and
praised the “spirit of progress” which to him was so apparent. Rumors of political
unrest, however, abounded. The Special Correspondent to the Daily Alta Calfironia, a
San Francisco paper, submitted a letter dated October 23, 1867, which looked for-
ward to the opening of Yedo, but went on to complain of the “strong English sympa-
thies” of the Yokohama papers such as the Herald and the Japan Times and their
report of the abdication of the Tycoon. He declared this rumor to be false. According
to the correspondent, “the Tycoon not only does not intend to abdicate, but is stronger
now in his seat than when first inaugurated.” He complained of the rumors and hinted
that the English were responsible. “Rumors to the contrary are set afloat by design,
but they are without foundation. There is a paper lately started here called the Gazette,
published by an American, but edited by an Englishman, so the American interests
have no real mouthpiece.” As far as he and American interests were concerned, “The
war is over, and the Empire is at peace within its borders, and attention is turning to
trade and business.”5)
The Daily Alta was sympathetic to the Tokugawa cause. If rumors of the Tycoon’s
abdication were true, it concluded, “we can conceive no greater misfortune to Japan at
this present time. Stotsbashi [Hitotsubashi], the Tycoon, is a prince of much enlight-
enment, and far in advance of any of those Daimios whose names are best known to
foreigners, was said to have abdicated and that the Mikado had conferred the Tycoon-
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ate on the son of the Prince of Owari.”6) Some rumors even proclaimed that the Ty-
coon had been assassinated. Again the Daily Alta rejected these reports and stated that
American interests were best served by supporting the Edo government: “The Tycoon
desires to favor the white people, but the majority of the nobility would sooner have
the land rid of their pestilent presence. The death of the present Tycoon would be
attended with a terrible war and the result of it can hardly be anticipated.”7)
Van Valkenbergh, in his letters to Seward, gave no indication of these rumors
about the Tycoon’s abdication or his assassination. Indeed, on November 7 he noted
that the Tycoon had been given additional titles and power, a good sign that events
were moving in the direction of homogeneity and consolidation.8) He concluded that
“no radical change in the constitution of this government is contemplated.”
This prophecy quickly proved wrong. On the afternoon of November 16, a Tokuga-
wa official informed Van Valkenburgh that the Tycoon was relieved of political re-
sponsibilities with respect to the internal affairs of Japan. In this way news of the
return of governing authority to the Emperor reached American ears. Van Valken-
burgh was shocked and immediately began gathering intelligence. He noted a great
movement of soldiers and munitions of war toward Kyoto. On December 3 he report-
ed that the opening of Edo was to be delayed until April 1. Suddenly Japan’s pros-
pects were clouded: “we are all uncertain whether war or peace is to be the order.”9)
The Daily Alta California came to a similar conclusion. A letter from Edo dated
December 2, 1867 described the partial abdication of the Tycoon on November 14.
“The Mikado has been considered as the spiritual head of the Japanese Empire, but by
this civil revolution, which it is, he has been clothed with new and formidable powers.
The Tycoon is still charged, however, with all matters related to foreign powers and
treaties . . . The civil affairs of Japan are completely revolutionized by this move-
ment, but we all hope that war will not ensure. So far the revolution has been a peace-
ful one, and we trust that it will not eventuate in bloodshed.”10)
Palace Coup — January 3, 1868
Van Valkenburgh found it very difficult to comprehend what took place on January
3, 1868. To Seward he attempted to lay out the details of the palace coup. Opponents
of the Tycoon arrived in Kyoto with more than 20,000 troops and took forcible pos-
session of the Mikado and the government. They issued a decree abolishing the office
of shogun, and proclaimed a new government. On the sixth, the Tycoon left Kyoto
and took up resident in Osaka. Van Valkenburgh was certain that civil war was immi-
nent: “the Tycoon and his adherents upon the one side, arrayed against Satsuma and
his allies upon the other.” His sympathies continued to be with the former bakufu.
“The Tycoon, as head of the Tokugawa family, is probably the most powerful and
wealthy person in Japan. In his own right he owns large provinces and receives vast
revenues. All of the open ports in Japan, including Yedo, Osaka, and Neegato [Niiga-
ta], are in his provinces. He has been very liberal in his negotiations with the foreign
representatives, is desirous of faithfully observing the treaties, and of strengthening
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the friendly relations with other powers, especially the United States, and in my opin-
ion is the most progressive and liberal in his ideas of any Japanese official.”11) None-
theless, if war were to ensue, Van Valkenburgh noted that he would preserve a strict
neutrality.
The letter from the special correspondent to the Alta, dated Osaka, January 18,
1868, gave particulars of the coup. The editorial, “Revolution in the Far East,” shows
how the restoration of imperial rule was understood in San Francisco: “It seems that
Prince Satsuma, an ambitious and somewhat unscrupulous Daimio, associating with
him several other of the hereditary feudal lords of the Empire, seized upon the Mika-
do, who is a young and inexperienced man, and by force of arms compelled him to
accept a quasi resignation of the Tycoon, and then, still holding the Mikado prisoner,
compelled him to entrust the Government of the Empire to the hands of a Council,
which extraordinary body was composed of Satsuma and his associates, or fellow
conspirators. . . . Such an act as that performed by the Mikado, under the compulsion
of terrorism, is as morally binding as a written obligation signed by a man with a
loaded pistol at his ear.”12)
The Tycoon remained in their eyes a friend of progress; the Satsuma conspirators,
on the other hand, “have not been altogether friendly to foreign influences, and have
regarded the concessions made to foreign trade with great distaste and ill-concealed
disgust. They have seized upon the internal commotions of the country as a pretext for
precipitating a political revolution.”13)
The New York Times agreed that the revolution had taken place in consequence of
the opening of new ports to foreigners.14) An editorial noted that ”the process of civi-
lizing Japan threatens to prove a very difficult one in consequences of a strong objec-
tion on the part of a majority of the Japanese Nobles to becoming civilized.” Satsuma
was described as the leader of an “anti-treaty” party and the Tycoon as the leader of
the “treaty party.” The New York Times urged American intervention to help suppress
the rebellion. “A vigorous support of Stots-Bashi by our fleet will be greatly to the
interests of civilization and commerce generally.”15)
Civil War Begins — January 26, 1868
The civil war began with the burning of the Satsuma Residence in Edo on January
19, 1868. As Van Valkenburgh was in Osaka at the time, the details of the fighting
were sent to Washington by Mr. A. L. C. Portman at the American legation in Yoko-
hama. He noted that the Edo government had been hard pressed to suppress the activ-
ities of bands of armed ruffians who were engaged in robbery and murder. They even
threatened to march on Yokohama to kill foreigners. “There is reason to suspect that
this extensive Ronin movement was not an isolated one, but that it formed part of a
vast scheme of surpassing boldness for the purpose of overturning the Tycoon’s gov-
ernment and substituting the supremacy of the Prince of Satsuma.” Portman interpret-
ed the ronin activities as part of a plot to “demonstrate to the treaty powers the oft-
alleged unfitness of the Tycoon and his ministers to hold the reign of government.”
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Acting on the pretext that the Satsuma men were about to kidnap the widow of the
former Shogun, a woman closely related to the imperial family, the Edo forces sur-
rounded the Satsuma residence and burnt it to the ground.16)
The attack on the Satsuma residence in Edo was the opening shot in Japan’s civil
war. On February 3, Van Valkenburgh sent a letter to Seward describing the events
which let up to the outbreak of hostilities in the Kansai district. He described a private
and social interview with the Tycoon on January 23. The conversation was ”almost
entirely led by the Tycoon, upon the form of government of the United States and
England, and the purchase of the Stonewall, which he seemed to be anxious to re-
ceive.”17) Three days later, on January 26, the war between the Tycoon and Satsuma
representing the Mikado’s government commenced. After four days of heavy
fighting, Van Valkenburgh was told that the Tycoon’s troops were in full retreat.
“From the top of my house, in the distance I had seen the burning fires of the yashikis
and villages, in the march of the retreating army, and had made ready to leave my
legation at a moment’s warning.” Van Valkenburgh was asked to help evacuate high
Tokugawa officials, including the Tycoon himself. “About two o’clock in the morn-
ing of the 31st January, accompanied by his prime minister and other high officials,
[the Tycoon] went on board the Iroquois by Japanese boats, remained there for about
two hours, and then was transferred to his own frigate, which arrived at daylight, and
upon which he sailed for Yedo.”18)
News of the outbreak of hostilities reached San Francisco on April 1, in a letter sent
from Yokohama on March 8. “The Empire is in arms . . . The revolution . . . has blos-
somed into war, and the crimson flowers are blooming in Japan. The Tycoon is ar-
rayed on one side against Satsuma, Choiskiu [Chos¯hu]¯, Tosa and the Confederated
Southern Daimios on the other. These latter, fighting under the banner of the Mikado,
the ancient spiritual head of the Empire, and now its monarch de facto.”19) The lan-
guage of the American civil war proved useful in describing what was taking place in
Japan: the Tycoon and his Northern allies were at war with Satsuma and the Confed-
erate South.
Neutrality — February 18, 1868
At the outset of the Battle of Osaka, on January 28, Tokugawa officials approached
Van Valkenburgh and asked for assurances that Americans would “confine them-
selves strictly to the terms of the treaty prohibiting merchants vessels from entering
unopened ports, and the sale of arms and ships of war to other than the Japanese
government.” Urging strict adherence to the law of nations during a time of civil war,
the senior counsellors urged the Americans to remain a stranger to the interior affairs
of the country. Van Valkenburgh immediately replied to this request to preserve neu-
trality, and on January 29 issued an order for American neutrality: “Hostilities having
commenced between the Tycoon and Matsudaira Sui no Daibu [Satsuma] you will be
careful to preserve a strict neutrality. . . . Munitions of war can only be sold to the
Japanese government, or to foreigners, and merchant vessels must not visit unopened
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ports.”20)
Several days later, however, the foreign representatives were forced to debate who
exactly represented the Japanese government. The Tycoon had lost and had retreated
to Yedo. Portman, in Yokohama, issued notification of neutrality within the 10 ri
treaty limits for the port of Kanagawa on Feburary 11. He wrote to Seward that he
would continue to deal with the Tycoon’s government in Edo as the de facto govern-
ment.21) In Kobe, on Feburary 8, Highashi Kuza Saki Noshosho [Higashikuze Michi-
tomi], envoy of the Mikado, met with the foreign representatives to announce that
henceforward the Emperor would exercise supreme authority, both in regard to the
internal and external affairs of the country. He assured the foreign representatives that
the treaties would be respected and that foreigners were entitled to protection from the
Japanese government, now defined as that of the Emperor. A series of meetings en-
sued in which the details of the relationship between the foreign powers and the new
government were worked out. On February 11 the issue of neutrality was discussed.
The Japanese officials wanted the foreign representatives to forbid foreign merchant
vessels to carry troops of the Tycoon to the seat of war. The diplomats replied that the
Mikado should issue a formal declaration of war against the Tycoon with requests
that no foreign merchant vessels would be allowed to carry troops and other war
material of the Tycoon, declaring at the same time that the government of the Mikado
would abstain from similar measures. In such a case, it would be understood that the
foreign representatives would preserve a strict neutrality between the contending par-
ties, having de facto relations with both. The declaration of war was duly delivered on
February 14. Four days later, on February 18, the United States and other foreign
representatives issued formal declarations of neutrality.22)
Van Valkenburgh pondered over the question of neutrality. Earlier in 1867 the
United States government had sold to the government of the Tycoon a powerful war-
ship, the ironclad Stonewall. The ship, one of the most sophisticated weapons of war,
was built in France for the Confederate Forces during the American civil war. Van
Valkenburgh knew that to deliver the Stonewall to the Tokugawa forces would pro-
long the war and disrupt commerce. On February 24 he told Seward that “The Ty-
coon, with the Stonewall in his possession, would at once command the seas; could
blockade successfully Osaka, Hiogo, and Nagasaki, all now in possession of the Mi-
kado, cutting off all communication, and thus prevent the carrying on of any business,
and endanger the lives and property of our countrymen.”23) He wrote to Portman in
Yokohama instructing him that, in view of the declaration of neutrality, the Stonewall
was not to be delivered to the Tycoon. Later, on February 28, a formal memorandum
was drawn up between the Foreign representatives which recognized both the Mikado
and the Tycoon as belligerents and insisting upon perfect neutrality. To this end it was
agreed the delivery to either of the contending parties of any vessel of war purchased
from one of the foreign powers would constitute a breach of neutrality.24) The Stone-
wall arrived in Yokohama on April 23 and, as agreed, was not turned over to the either
of the belligerents. It remained, however, an important factor in the outcome of Ja-
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pan’s civil war. As the Daily Alta California put it:
“There is a craft . . . lying in Japanese waters which will secure the victory to the
party to which she may be surrendered. She is the war steamer called the Stonewall,
originally constructed for the rebels. She fell into our hands and other assets of the
defunct confederacy at the close of the rebellion. Sometime ago she was sold by our
Government to the Government of Japan, then represented by the Tycoon. When she
arrived, there was, in consequences of the late difficulties, a doubt as to whether she
was to be delivered to the Tycoon or the Mikado. In this strait our Minister, Mr. Van
Valkenburg, forbid the transfer, and substituted the Stars and Stripes for the Japanese
Flag. If that vessel should be delivered to the Tycoon, Japan would soon be at his feet.
All the great cities of the Islands are on the seaboard; and this one vessel, if properly
manned, would be sufficient to reduce the whole of them.”25)
The Takeover of Edo — May 2, 1868
Despite the declaration of neutrality, American sympathies continued to be with
the Tokugawa. On Feburary 24, when Portman in Yokohama learned of the intention
of the Tycoon to abdicate and nominate a successor, he immediately wrote to express
American support for the foreign policy pursued by the Edo government, and urged
him to reconsider his resignation. Later, on March 2, 1868 Portman wrote to Seward
giving his views on the situation in Japan and complaining of the actions of Satsuma:
“the Mikado is now to all intents and purposes the vassal if not the prisoner of that
bold and unscrupulous Daimio.”26) Van Valkenburgh visited Osaka of March 5 where
he learned that large bodies of troops loyal to the Mikado were marching toward
Edo.27) On March 12 he left Hiogo for Yokohama. After staying there a few days, on
the 18th he entered Edo and began a round of discussions with the governors of for-
eign affairs and the head of the junior counsellors. He was the only foreign represen-
tative in Edo; indeed Van Valkenburgh’s presence in Edo contrasts sharply with the
other foreign representatives who were invited to Kyoto on March 23 for an audience
with the Mikado.
In Edo, Van Valkenburgh learned of the Tycoon’s plans to submit to the orders of
the Mikado. To this end he had entered confinement at a temple in Ueno, “thus prov-
ing to his people the sincerity of his submission.” The Mikado’s troops were expected
to arrive in ten days or two weeks: “This is a strange country and a singular people. I
am unable to say what will occur; I think there will be slight or no opposition to their
entering Yedo; yet after they have once arrived I fear much blood will be shed in
street fights, and that, too, perhaps by organized bodies of men . . . I shall not remain
here.”28)
Van Valkenburgh returned to Yokohama. Edo was to be opened to foreigners on
April 1, but the possibility of hostilities in the area forced another postponement.
Beginning around April 30, members of the advance guard of the Mikado’s army
began to appear on the streets of Yokohama, causing much alarm. According to the
report of the Daily Alta California, “The Mikado’s soldiers, in marching along the
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Tokaido (or national military highway) towards Yedo, straggled in large numbers into
Yokohama, apparently under no control or order. They entered native and foreign
houses and, when intoxicated, acted in a rude manner, and in one instance pulled a
gold ear-ring out of the ear of an English lady. The people were alarmed and excit-
ed.”29)
As the Mikado’s troops slowly marched toward Edo, the people of the city, espe-
cially women and children, began moving away. On April 14, Van Valkenburgh
wrote to Seward that “should this continue at the present rate, there will be scarcely
any one left in Yedo within a few days but men, and it is not unreasonable to expect
that there will then be an outbreak.”30) He learned of the extravagant demands that had
been placed on the Tycoon “to surrender his castle, . . . to surrender his army, his
navy, and his treasury, his own person to be placed in charge of the Prince of Bizen,
and all his own people to vacate their houses and to withdraw to a certain named
outskirts of Yedo.”31)
On April 23, Van Valkenburgh heard that the Mikado’s envoy, Hashimoto no
Shosho, passed through Kanagawa on his way to Edo to negotiate the surrender of
Edo Castle; Van Valkenburgh hoped that this would lead to a peaceful termination of
the present difficulties.32) By the end of the month the supremacy of the Mikado’s
government seemed assured. Yokohama had passed out of Tokugawa control as had
Edo. Van Valkenburg wrote Seward on April 27 that “The late Tycoon is in retire-
ment at a temple in Yedo. The Mikado’s envoys has reached that city, and we trust to
hear before long of the amicable settlement of all difficulties.” Still he warned that
there were armed bodies of ronins roaming the countryside and active in Edo, respon-
sible to no one, and that a state of guerrilla warfare would probably ensue for some
time.33)
While the British Minister Parkes left for Osaka to present a letter of credence to
the Mikado, Van Valkenburgh and other foreign representatives were less eager to
conclude that order had been restored under the undivided sway of the Mikado. They
remained in Yokohama. Van Valkenburgh described the takeover of Edo in a letter
dated May 25. The castle was surrendered and on May 2 and the former Tycoon left
Edo for Mito. There he was reported to reside with a force between five and six thou-
sand well armed men. Keiki left orders to his army, navy, and treasury to surrender,
but the orders were all disobeyed: “the army scattered, taking their arms with them;
the ships of war got up steam and left the Yedo anchorage and the treasury is reported
to have been found quite empty.”34) Van Valkenburgh concluded that the Mikado’s
victory was hollow. Indeed reports reached his ears on May 12 of the defeat of the
Mikado’s troops in a battle with the disbanded army some 80 miles north of Edo.
“Almost daily . . .  rumors of fights and skirmishes have been received here, nearly all
of which are reported to have been adverse to the troops of the new government.”35)
Van Valkenburgh noted that the former Tycoon remained in possession of the eight
provinces of the Kanto ¯as well as the three provinces of Sumga [Suruga], Totomi, and
Simodzke [Shimotsuke]. Thus, despite the surrender of Edo, “unless the Tokugawa
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clan be shorn of most of it property, the chief of this clan will remain by far the most
powerful personage in this empire.”36)
Reactionism vs. Liberalism
Thus while the British were trumpeting the triumph of the Mikado, Van Valkeng-
burgh came to a more pessimistic conclusion: “The present crisis or revolution has
clearly revealed the utter rottenness of the Japanese system of government. Treachery
cropped up everywhere, and unless the Daimios who are with the Mikado are better
than those who were formerly with the Tycoon, which is very doubtful, the Mikado,
should the tide turn against his flag, may be betrayed in his turn.”37) Indeed, in com-
paring the prospect of the two belligerents, the former Tycoon still maintained the
advantage. The Tycoon “is reputed extremely intelligent, in advance of his country-
men, and the best-informed person on the affairs of this country. He has no debt, and
his treasury was sound. . . . On the other hand, the southern Daimios who have
the control of the Mikado are not apparently in so favorable a situation. Choshin
[Chos¯hu]¯ and Tosa have only slightly exceeded their revenue. The case of the Prince
of Satsuma, however, appears to be much more serious. This prince is known to be
heavily in debt, principally to English merchants, for supplies of ships, arms, and
munitions of war, etc.”38)
The American press came to similar conclusions. A June 4 letter from the special
correspondent to the Alta praised the Tycoon as a peacemaker: “he knew it would be
useless to prolong a struggle which would bring untold misery upon his country, like
the large and liberal-minded man that he is, his greatest efforts were put forth to re-
strain the ferocious passions of his clansmen and friends, and so far as in him lay, he
put an end to the war.” After describing the Tycoon’s sad departure from Edo, the
report suggested that the new government would soon be forced to recall him. “It is
the prevailing opinion that the Mikado will be so propitiated by the implicit obedience
yield by the late Stotbashi that he will soon be recalled from his retirement and be
admitted to the councils of the State.”39) An article on July 28 gave news of the victo-
ries of pro-Tokugawa guerrillas in the north, and concluded that the eventual outcome
would be “a division of the country into two independent empires, governed by the
Mikado and the Tycoon.”40)
The Daily Alta editorial which appeared the next day gave reasons why Americans
should support the Tycoon. First of all, the Mikado’s government had revived decrees
against Christians. It was anti-foreign, whereas the Tycoon was a friend of progress.
The Mikado, moreover, was a “ghostly personage,” who may or may not even exist.
“No two persons agree in their description of his face. Some locate his eyebrows high
upon his forehead, others low down and immediately over the eyes. The impulsive Sir
Harry and his companions may have been treated to nothing more than a Japanese
stage trick.”41)
If the government of the Mikado was a sham, Satsuma was described as an evil
force pulling the strings from behind the stage. “He is the leader of the party which is
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determined, at all hazards, to secure a ‘white man’s government’ for Japan. The plat-
form upon which he has taken his stand is ‘the Constitution as it and the Japanese
islands as they were.’ Satsuma is opposed to all change. He is the champion of immo-
bility—the Horatio Seymour of that strange group of islands which have so long been
a puzzle to the rest of the world.”42)
It was too early, the paper cautioned, to cede victory to the reactionary forces. “The
Tycoon, who was represented by the last mail completely subjugated, and engaged in
a pilgrimage with bare feet, has put on his shoes and is now reported at the head of an
army of two hundred thousand men, menacing the very city out of which he had
walked but a short time before in such a submissive and penitential manner. He is the
representative of the party of progress. It was from him that the foreigners have ob-
tained all the concessions which they now enjoy. If it were safe to venture an opinion
in relation to politics in Japan in the imperfect light as yet furnished, it might be said
that the Tycoon has formed the project of demolishing the old superstitions of the past
and bringing the islands into full and complete intercourse will all the nations of the
earth. He has given evidence of the liberality of his views by sending his brother to
Europe to be educated. This was at least an admission that the foreigners have some-
thing worth studying.”43)
The Mikado of the North — August, 1868
Van Valkenburgh was aware that the Mikado’s government was suffering from
financial and military problems after it succeeded in occupying Edo. Peasant unrest
and bands of guerrilla soldiers denied the imperial army control of the countryside
surrounding Edo and within the city, groups of young pro-Tokugawa loyalists such as
the Shog¯itai meant that much of the city remained enemy territory. Moreover, many
domains which had initially sided with the Mikado became freshly undecided. Taking
advantage of the apparent weakness of the occupying forces, high Tokugawa officials
began to petition Kyoto for the return of Tycoon. Van Valkenburgh noted that there
were reports daily of skirmishes and engagement, and in nearly all of those have the
forces of the new government been defeated.44) He paid particular attention to the role
played by the Miya Sama [Rinnoj¯i no miya], the younger brother of the late Emperor
Kom¯ei (and uncle to the Mikado), and chief priest at Kaneiji, the temple stronghold of
the Shog¯itai loyalists atop Ueno Hill. With the departure of the Tycoon for Mito, the
people of Edo were increasingly looking to him for leadership if not salvation. “This
high dignitary is strongly in favor of the Tokugawa interest, and his influence in Yedo
is very great.” The imperial forces in Edo wanted to remove him from Edo, but met
with stiff popular resistance. Outside of Edo, Van Valkenburgh described the forma-
tion of a coalition of northern Daimyo, headed by Sendai and Aizu against the Mika-
do’s government which was steadily gaining strength and solidity.45)
Van Valkenburgh’s next dispatch, dated June 14, again emphasized the difficulties
encountered by the new government. In Owari, for example, “there are now two par-
ties — one in favor of the old and the other in favor of the new government . . . The
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same appears to be more or less the case in other provinces.” He also noted that severe
losses in fights, from murders, and poisoning among the southern troops has required
reinforcements, and that these men were being conveyed in English steamers. He
complained to the British about this violation of neutrality. “This neutrality I consider
it my duty strictly to maintain. I respectfully decline to listen to overtures for the
transfer of the Stonewall, repeatedly made within the last few days by the representa-
tives of the Mikado’s government . . . This great anxiety to obtain possession of the
Stonewall and to re-enforce the troops who are operating in this part of Japan, conclu-
sively shows that there is great need for maintaining neutrality.”46) Van Valkenburgh
reported that he had received an official letter from the Mikado on June 13 stating that
the war was over and asking for the withdrawal of neutrality; he rejected this request,
saying that “I prefer to believe the evidence of my own eyes.”47)
Van Valkenburgh’s letter of June 26 spoke warmly of the northern confederacy of
daimyo: “thirteen daimyo of the north in perfect union, even to the extent of declaring
war against the Mikado.” He also related plans by the northern daimyo to seek an
understanding with the Miya Sama to serve as their spiritual if not temporal leader, to
proclaim him, in fact, as the true Mikado. Van Valkenburgh did not think this out of
the question. “In such a case there might be two Mikados; and as the new one would
probably obtain the suffrages of the majority of Daimios and of those who represent
the most powerful interests, such scheme would probably possess all the elements of
success.”48)
Historians often refer to the defeat of the Shog¯itai at the Battle of Ueno Hill on July
10, 1868 as evidence of the supremacy of the new imperial government.49) Edo was
finally and fully in imperial hands. Van Valkenburgh, however, downplayed its
significance. In a letter to Seward on July 13 he conceded “that the southern troops
now hold complete sway at Edo,” but he laid more emphasis on the failure to obtain
control of the Miya Sama, the chief symbol of forces opposed to the new government.
“The principle object of the attack was not attained, and . . the Miya Sama had left his
temple and proceeded to the north . . . strongly escorted by volunteers.”50)
Later, on July 25, Van Valkenburgh criticized the southern conquerors of Edo for
“indulging freely in dissipation” and held out hope for a reversal in the fortunes of the
Tokugawa side: “With a treasury that shows as yet no signs of weakness, the Tokuga-
wa chiefs can hold out much longer than their southern opponents, who not only
exceeded their revenues, but are heavily in debt to English and French subjects be-
sides.”51) He also passed on reports that Kugo Dainagon, the Kyoto noble who was to
have taken charge of the northern provinces, has turned against the new government
and instead “authorized the northern coalition to raise the Mikado’s flag their
cause.”52)
The correspondent to the Alta, in a letter from Yokohama dated July 26, explained
the new development as follows: “Now that both parties have proclaimed for the
Mikado and are struggling for the possession of his person, the chances are equalized,
seemingly to the disgust of the Southerners. Choisu [Chos¯hu]¯ is reported to have
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withdrawn from the coalition and returned to his dominions; and it is said that the
“tojin”[foreigner]-beating Satsuma is weakening.”53)
For readers of the Daily Alta California, the situation in Japan was becoming in-
creasingly difficult to understand. An editorial on August 17, in response to the July
26 letter which was printed on that day, attempted a simple outline of the course of
events: ”A party of powerful princes — daimios — in the South, had formed a con-
federacy to take possession of the person and influence of the Mikado, or spiritual
Emperor. These men, with Satsuma and Choisu, two powerful Daimios, at the head,
are opposed to foreign influence, and are Japanese ‘conservatives.’ They do not be-
lieve in the Mikado’s being anything more than a mortal man, though the common
people believe him to be sent to earth by the gods, and that at his so-called death he
returns to them. This superstition of the mass of the people is the reason why the
Mikado is so desirable a prize to the ambitious Princes — Satsuma & Co.
Against this combination are the Northern Daimios, who espouse the cause of the
ex-Tycoon, and are in favor of a restoration of the office which the Mikado’s party has
pretended to abolish. The Northern Party has been continually growing in power and
strength. . . . The sympathies of foreigners, desirous of opening trade with Japan,
and of seeing an enlightened and liberal generation in that country, are all with the
Tycoon or Northern party, whatever it may be called. The inhuman persecution of
Christians, . . . the continual restrictions on trade, and snubbing of the foreigners in
Japan, are all the work of the Mikado, or the people who use him as a political pup-
pet.”54)
Van Valkenburgh’s letter of August 20 informed Washington about the ascension
of Miya Sama as Mikado of the North. “This high dignitary is now said to have for-
mally entered upon the duties of Mikado, taking the Haguro Mountain temples for the
residence of himself and court.”55) Japan, he declared, now has two Mikados, a south-
ern court and a northern court. The new Mikado would serve as the spiritual chief of
the northern domains; he would unite their hearts and assure the people of the north
that they were not forsaken by their gods. Van Valkenburgh reasoned that the advent
of a new Mikado “was a master stroke on the part of the Tokugawa chief, as his
presence consolidated the great northern coalition, and by allaying superstitious fears
among the people more than doubled its power.”56) According to the Alta on August
29, the soldiers of the North had taken the name of “Shin-Kangun” and wear a similar
crest to that of the Southern troops, only in green and gold. The first act of the new
Mikado was to change the name of the year from Keio to Genju [to lengthen life]. His
second act was to appoint Kujo Dainagon to Daijo Daijin of the new northern govern-
ment. The newspaper described a general distrust by for the Southern government by
the people in the Kanto provinces. They were refusing to pay their taxes. Moreover,
“large numbers of volunteers join the Northern army daily, and even women are said
to take an active part in the strife.” And if the North proved victorious, the Mikado of
the North was certain to be the ruler of a united Japan, the other Mikado being forced
into retirement.57)
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The Triangular War — October 4, 1868
After the Stonewall arrived on April 24, representatives of the Mikado and of the
former Tycoon repeatedly requested that the vessel be turned over to them. On July 2,
for example, a envoy from Higashi Kuze Jijin arrived asking for the Stonewall, but
was refused. In response to a rumor that the Americans had agreed to turn over the
Stonewall, Enomoto Takeaki, the commander-in-chief of the Tycoon’s navy rushed
to Yokohama to discuss the fate of the ship. Enomoto was unable to meet directly
with Van Valkenburgh, but the record of his conversation with Portman left a strong
impression on the American minister. According to Enomoto, “The government of
the Mikado, so called, as at present constituted, is an impossibility. Its principal sup-
porters were already abandoning the scheme. . . . The Daimios of the north, on the
other hand, were thoroughly united, ready to raise their flags and to march for the re-
establishment of the former government and the maintenance of their rights.”58)
Enomoto proceeded to give a detailed account of Tokugawa efforts to forestall hostil-
ities and seek a negotiated settlement. If moderation proved impossible, however, the
Tokugawa army and navy will receive orders to march. In any case, he emphasized
that the Stonewall should not be delivered to what he called the “so-called” Mikado’s
government. “The Stonewall was bought with my master’s money, and duly trans-
ferred to his authorized agents in American waters. If now my master, was then Ty-
coon, and the recognized sovereign of Japan, should simply become a Daimio, or
chief of the Tokugawa clan, I claim, that even in such case this can be given to him,
and to no one else.”59)
Van Valkenburgh was impressed with Enomoto: “Educated in Europe, where he
spent five years, he consistently advocated progress, and a liberal foreign inter-
course.” He wrote Seward that he was inclined to believe Enomoto’s assessment of
the current political situation and that he was most interested in his description of
Tokugawa policy: “passive resistance, with force in the background.”60)
On July 27 a group of men from Chos¯hu ¯officers arrived in Yokohama in yet anoth-
er attempt to gain possession of the Stonewall. Again they were refused. According to
Van Valkenburgh, Chos¯hu ¯was thoroughly anti-foreign and consequently: “Of all
dignitaries in this country, this Prince Choshin, in my opinion, is the last to whom
such a ship could with safety be delivered.”61)
On September 18, Higashikuze Chinjio visited Van Valkenburgh saying that the
Mikado’s government, being at war, had great need of the Stonewall. His argument
was that since the property of the Tycoon had all been turned over to the new govern-
ment, it was therefore entitled to receive the Stonewall or the money paid for her by
the Tycoon, but that they would prefer the ship to the money. Van Valkenburgh said
he needed time to get instructions from Washington, but reminded Higashikuze that
in the early part of the year “both Mikado and Tycoon requested me that the United
States should maintain strict neutrality in the struggle that was then impending . . .
and in concert with my colleagues . . . I issued a notification of neutrality. . . . Under
those circumstances and while war was existing it was impossible for me to deliver
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the Stonewall.” The Mikado’s envoy then repeatedly asked Van Valkenburgh to with-
draw the neutrality notification; in reply, he “asked them how I could consistently do
so, while war was ranging [sic-raging] in Japan, as they freely had admitted.”62)
Word that the Mikado would take up residence in Yedo and that the name of the
capital had been changed to East Kioto arrived on September 17. Van Valkenburgh
gave the announcement scant attention. The correspondent to the Daily Alta, writing
on September 27, attempted to put the new city name into context: “The (Southern)
Mikado has issued a decree changing the name of Yedo to East Kioto and he has
officially announced his intention of establishing himself there for the present. Japa-
nese officials have so much crooked diplomacy that we hesitate at believing that this
last flourish is anything more than a bit of military strategy to force the people of this
part of Japan into a more cordial support of the Mikado.”63) On September 23,
Tokugawa Kamenosuke, the heir to the Tokugawa family following the abdication of
the former Tycoon, was awarded the domain in Suruga with an annual revenue of
700,000. Van Valkenburgh recorded the event, but with no comment. The California
press, however, wrote that the young Kamenosuke had been bought out. “This cau-
tious youth, in consideration of 700,000 kokus (how much or whatever they may be),
to be paid or delivered to him every year, has surrendered to the Mikado the right to
make treaties with France and America and run the Japanese machine exclusively. . . .
This little transaction finished, there does not now appear to be any serious obstacle in
the way of the Mikado.”64)
On October 4, Enomoto Takeaki, responding to the changed situation, made good
his threat to resort to force if attempts at achieving a just settlement failed. He led a
squadron of eight warships out of Edo Bay and headed north, carrying with it a land
force of between five thousand and six thousand men. Van Valkenburgh wrote to
Seward that the army and naval officers of the late government had decided to aban-
don the course of neutrality and take an active part in the struggle with all the means
at their command. Reports of southern victories in the war against the northern league
of daimyo may also have prompted Enomoto to act. In any case, the civil war in Japan
had taken a new turn. As Van Valkenburgh noted, “The contest in some respects has
now become a sort of triangular one.”65) He referred to the struggle between the
Mikado, the Northern Government, and now the naval and military chiefs of the late
government. He quoted Enomoto’s statement of purpose which found both the south-
erners and northerners at fault. “The object of one party is to utterly destroy their
opponents and take possession of their property; nor has the other party any other
object.”66)
On October 23, Van Valkenburgh received news “announcing that the (Kioto) Mi-
kado had been crowned in that city.” He was also told that the Kioto Mikado would
arrive in Edo shortly. This news, however, did little to improve Van Valkenburgh’s
impression of the young monarch. In a letter to Seward dated November 7, after re-
marking on the conflicting reports of victories and defeats about the wars in the north,
and noting that Enomoto’s fleet had been damaged in a typhoon and was repairing in
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Sendai Bay, Van Valkenburgh concluded that overall matters were in a most deplor-
able condition: “The Mikado, the nominal head of what is miscalled the government
of Japan, and utterly irresponsible, in virtue of his alleged descent from the gods, is a
mere instrument under the control of a few Daimios and others, who are zealously
endeavoring to establish a monarchy, but which thus far has proved to be a simple
despotism of the worst description.” As to the outcome of the war, he felt that the
northerners held the advantage: “I do not believe that the south, notwithstanding its
tremendous efforts, can subjugate the north; and even if they did, that they can suc-
ceed in holding it in submission for any length of time.”67)
In California, the news of the “Apparent Triumph of the Mikado” was reported
tongue in cheek. An editorial, dated November 24, criticized the young Mikado who
“has himself anointed and crowned. He now claims to be the autocrat of all Japan. No
longer will he keep his eyes fixed upon heavenly objects. He will exercise the Tempo-
ral as well as the Spiritual functions of the Empire. This, we presume, means for us
outside pertinacious Barbarians that we shall have to negotiate with him over again
for whatever privileges are now enjoyed in Japan.”68) The New York Times had even
harsher words to describe the new status of the Mikado: “The Mikado, who has been
slowly and painfully emerging from the seclusion of centuries, like a butterfly from its
chysalis, has at length consummated the act, thanks to my Lord Satsuma, and has
celebrated it by a royal coronation. In the imperial City of Kioto, at 8 o’clock A.M., on
Oct. 12, year of grace 1868, the splendid farce was enacted, and the poor boy, born a
priest and educated a woman, was dragged out to play the King for the pleasure of the
Southern Daimios.”69)
Van Valkenburgh was reluctant to admit the defeat of the Northern army, rejecting
a series of reports of Aizu’s capitulation as in late November as hearsay or exaggera-
tion. He repeated to Seward that the war was not over and that the winter cold would
come to the rescue of the hardier Northern people. Soon after the triumphal entry of
the young Mikado into the new Eastern Capital, Van Valkenburgh finally admitted
that the Southern Army had won this phase of the war. To some, Japan’s civil war
seemed over. The New York Times looked forward to the beginning of a new era for
Japan.70) When the Daily Alta printed the story confirming the surrender of Aizu,
however, they had news of events in Hokkaido which made it declare ”that the state-
ment that the civil war in Japan was over was rather premature.”71)
The Hokkaido Government — January 27, 1869
The civil war in Japan entered yet another phase when Enomoto and his fleet suc-
ceeded in occupying the port of Hakodate on December 8 and proceeded to secure
possession of the entire island of Hokkaido. On December 11, the American represen-
tative at Hakodate, E. E. Rice, wrote to Van Valkenburgh in Yokohama describing
the takeover. He included a copy of the manifesto of the “exiled retainers” of the
Tokugawa clan which stated their intention to set up a separate government on Hok-
kaido. “There is no doubt that H.M. the Mikado is possessed of very good intentions
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to rule all Japan properly, but we know that he is often misled by several members of
his Court. . . . We are quite as capable to govern and protect Japanese traders and
farmers as . . . The civil war compelled us to leave the Provinces of the Kwanto so
long inhabited by our ancestors; Yeso [Ezo, the old name for Hokkaido] will become
a new province of Tokugawa and no doubt the Mikado will comprehend that we will
work here for the general good of Japan as well as for our own benefit.”72) Van Valk-
enburgh replied on December 12 instructing Rice to “show strict neutrality transact-
ing all necessary business with the Government de facto.”73) Rice met frequently with
Enomoto and his officers and kept Van Valkenburgh informed of their activities,
stressing that they were not pirates, as the English maintained, but a well organized
government with plenty of weapons and troops.74)
Rice openly sympathized with Enomoto. On December 30, the last day of 1868,
Rice wrote a long letter to Seward described the recent dramatic events: “This day
closes the most eventful year of my long residence in Japan in many respects. Politi-
cally, the most remarkable in the history of this country for more than two hundred
years. The downfall of the Tycoon or Tokugawa Dynasty, and the assumption of the
reins of Government by the Spiritual Emperor, a youth of fourteen years, through the
agency of disaffected and ambitious Daimios, who seized his person and flag, for the
purpose of self-aggrandizement and political position.” He then went on to describe
the defeat of the Mikado’s forces in Hakodate, who after the first fire fled in a most
disorderly manner. “The victory was so complete and unexpected that the city was
left without a government for twenty-seven hours, except that provided by the Con-
suls and street officers, after which time the Tokugawa party arrived and have since
conducted the affairs of Government in a most satisfactory manner.”75)
Rice even urged Enomoto to write to Van Valkenburgh, and seek American help in
petitioning the Mikado to permit Tokugawa settlement on Hokkaido. In his appeal,
Enomoto contrasted the “well organized government” of the United States with the
Asian style of government where “there is too great a distance between the Sovereign
and the people, and as there is no interchange of opinion between them, it often hap-
pens that without good cause the Sovereign blame the people and the people hate the
Sovereign.”76) Enomoto objected to being labeled a rebel or pirate, and stated that it
were merely his desire to bring civilization to Hokkaido and provide a place of refuge
for those true men of Tokugawa and others suffering from oppression. Later, on Jan-
uary 26, Enomoto sent a statement to Rice announcing his intention to establish the
Tokugawa Government of Yesso, a permanent government with officers selected
through elections on the basis of universal suffrage. He announced celebrations to be
held on the 27th to commemorate “our taking possession de facto, of the entire Island
of Yesso. We shall fire in this occasion 101 guns in the morning, from the port of
Hakodade.”77) January 27 was also election day and the American Consul was in-
formed that “Mr. Enomoto Kamadizro, Admiral of the Navy of Tokugawa, has been
elected by vote to be Governor General, to have charge in the direction of the Govern-
ment of the island of Yeso, and a the same time Mr. Matsudaira Taro to be Vice
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Governor General.”78) In his correspondence with Washington, Van Valkenburgh referred
to the new de facto government of Hokkaido and conferred rights as belligerents on
Enomoto and his men. Two governments, in American eyes at least, existed in Japan.
Withdrawal of Neutrality — February 11, 1868
Given these new developments, the Mikado’s government once again approached
Van Valkenburgh asking the United States to withdraw its neutrality proclamation
and permit the delivery of the Stonewall. Van Valkenburgh refused: “I believe it to be
the true policy and the interest of the United States as long as war continues in Japan
not to withdraw the neutrality proclamation.”79) On January 5, 1869, Van Valken-
burgh, along with other foreign representatives, was invited to the Imperial Palace in
Tokyo for a formal audience with the Mikado. This was his first meeting with the
young emperor, and he was pleasantly surprised: “If the sovereignty of the Mikado be
only nominal at present, it is to be hoped that it may become a reality at an early day,
as it seems impossible that this country can ever be reunited and strong under any
other chief than the one whose recent reception of the Foreign representatives has
given such satisfaction to all.”80) It took another month of intense lobbying efforts by
Iwakura Tomomi and the English Minister Harry Parkes before Van Valkenburgh
finally agreed to consider the withdrawal of neutrality. Reports reaching Yokohama
on January 21 of the wreck of Enomoto’s most powerful warship, the Kaiyo-maru,
were instrumental in causing Van Valkenburgh and others foreign ministers to re-
consider the viability of the Hokkaido regime. Still, it was not until February 11 that
official notice was given, thereby denying the Enomoto and his men status of belliger-
ents. Finally, on March 8, the Stonewall was allowed to join the Mikado’s navy. Offi-
cially, Japan was no longer at war.
The American press nonetheless remained suspicious of the motives of the Mika-
do’s government. On March 28, the Alta carried a article from the Gazette which
explained why the South had won the war: unity achieved by a “reign of terror.” The
North was forced to sucumb because of its inability to hold together in the same
way.81) Later, on April 1, 1869, the Alta declared that “It seems that the Mikado’s
government proclaimed that the war had ceased merely to secure possession of that
“Curio ship” and ponderous elephant, the Stonewall. For they no sooner had her in
their custody than the utmost possible dispatch was used to inform the foreign lega-
tions that war existed in the North, and that the Imperial Government was determined
to use all its force to subdue the insurrection.”82) And even at the very end when
Enomoto was defeated and Japan’s civil war was truly over, Americans still held out
some measure of sympathy for the northern cause. On July 4, American Indepen-
dence Day, 1869, some six months after the inauguration of the Hokkaido govern-
ment, an American in Hakodate wrote: “The great Republican Government of Yesso
is ended and some eight of the principle actors are on their way to Yedo overland in
cages to be exhibited to all who oppose the will of Sir Harry and his Japanese allies.
. . . Thus ends the first attempt at liberalism in Japan.”83)
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Conclusion
Van Valkenburgh had a distinguished career in politics and in the military before
taking up his appointment as resident minister to Japan in 1866. He was a member of
the New York State Assembly in 1852, 1857, and 1858, and of the thirty-seventh and
thirty-eighth Congresses, 1861–65. These were the years of the American civil war.
Without resigning his seat in the House of Representatives, he commanded a recruit-
ing bureau at Elmira, New York, and organized seventeen volunteer regiments. He
was colonel of the 107th Regiment, New York Volunteer Infantry, which he com-
manded at the bloody Battle of Antietam. In recognition of his service, he was made
Brigadier-General.
Van Valkenburgh’s civil war experience was a lens through which he sought to
understand events taken place in Japan. He was open to arguments stressing the jus-
tice of the Northern cause against the South. As he understood it, the Mikado was
merely a puppet under the control of Satsuma; the Southern camp was conservative,
anti-Christian, anti-foreign and was willing to sacrifice principle for power. To use
the language of the American civil war, the South stood for the aristocratic “white
man’s government.” The Northern side, on the other hand, represented the forces of
progress and spoke of justice, openness, righteousness, independence, and liberation.
Such were his hopes for Japan’s future. And such was the framework within which he
sought to frame the story of Japan’s civil war. “The present convulsion, instead of
being fraught with danger to the independence of the people . . . will undoubtedly
secure for them, in the creation of a middle class, the first gleam of real liberty, with-
out which their independence, so called, is a sham, and not more. Whoever may be the
next ruler of a united Japan, I feel confident will profit by experience, and base the
policy of this country upon the support of the people instead of the two-sided class.”84)
Van Valkenburgh’s view of Japan’s civil war is also interesting because the story
line he (and the American press) developed to explain what happened in Japan be-
tween 1867 and 1869 differs remarkably from the story line with which we (who are
interested in Japanese history) are normally accustomed. First of all, the chronology is
different. I have emphasized this by retaining the dates in the Western calendar. Van
Valkenburgh’s narrative placed particular attention on the notification of neutrality
(February 18, 1868) and its withdrawal almost exactly one year later (February 11,
1869) — the period in-between were Japan’s war years, but they were punctuated by
an unfamiliar set of turning points. Secondly, the contestants were different. Satsuma
manipulated the Mikado; the Tycoon choose a strategy of passive resistance; the
Northern League set up a rival Mikado-centered government in the Tohoku area; dis-
satisfied Tokugawa retainers sought to set up an independent government on Hok-
kaido. In the end, Satsuma proved triumphant, but it was not righteousness that pre-
vailed but power. And by no means was the victory of the Mikado inevitable; Van
Valkenburgh’s description of the fractious nature of the Southern coalition and its
precarious financial health emphasizes a thin line between victory and defeat.
We need not accept the American version of Japan’s civil war in its entirety. It was
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based on limited and sometimes incorrect information and a view shaped by contem-
porary American issues and interests. But Van Valkenburgh’s narrative is interesting
precisely because it offers another view of an important event in Japanese history. All
historical narratives are constructions. Analyzing Valkenburg’s account points to the
importance of re-examining the ways in which established narratives of the Meiji
Restoration have been constructed and the limitations and prejudices that they, too,
reflect.
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